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# ARMING INDONESIA

by Lenny Siegel

Pacific Studies Center



The Ford Administration has asked Congress to double arms aid and sales to Indonesia. Since Indonesia is SE Asia's largest anti-communist power, many Congressmen support such assistance to counterbalance a threat posed by Indochinese socialism. To the executive branch, the question is simple. US aid to Indonesia has been successful. Indonesia is no longer drifting toward communism; instead it encourages investment by multinational extractive corporations.

But two groups of Congressmen may oppose expanded aid. First, conservatives are reluctant to offer assistance to a member of OPEC. Second, liberals are concerned that continued aid will allow the Suharto regime to maintain its miserable record on human rights. Should the debate over military aid to Indonesia surface, it will deal directly with US policy aims in SE Asia. This is nothing new. Though most Americans know little about Indonesia, the history of US aid policy there demonstrates constant political concern.

## DITCHING SUKARNO

The US government has based its policies on military aid to Indonesia on political considerations at least since the early sixties. In 1963 Congress added a provision to foreign aid legislation prohibiting most military aid to the Sukarno regime. Congressmen were reacting against Indonesia's belligerent posture toward newly organized Malaysia, and its left-leaning political orientation. The Congressional prohibition halted construction of an Indonesian military communications system and cut off shipments of weaponry.It did not, however, immediately halt the training of Indonesian military officers by the US. As late as March, 1965, just six months before the coup that took power from Sukarno, there were at least 12 Indonesians undergoing military training in the US.[2]

Administration officials and their allies in Congress had even opposed a phase-down of training programs for Indonesia's military and police The US had trained "1200 Indonesian officers, including senior military figures" and over 500 police officials between independence and the 1965 coup. In addition, by 1964 the US had participated in the training, within Indonesia, of 62,000 of the 110,000 police in Indonesia's national police force.[3] They argued, at the time, that continued training won friends and influenced people in the Indonesian armed forces.

The entire story of American complicity with the Suharto coup and ensuing massacre may never be known, but key American leaders have bragged of the success that training programs played in Sukarno's downfall. In 1968 Pentagon official Paul Warnke described American military assistance to Indonesia in the latter days of the Sukarno regime:

> The purpose for which it was maintained was not to support an existing regime. In fact, we were opposed, eventually and increasingly to the then existing regime. It was to preserve a liaison of sorts with the military of the country which in effect turned out to be one of the conclusive elements in the overthrow of that regime. [4]

The House Foreign Affairs Committee staff agreed. They wrote in 1971:

> The outcome in Indonesia indicates the success of US policies from 1963 to 1965 in continuing to supply training to the Indonesian military in spite of criticism at home and abroad that the US was only strengthening Sukarno's Indonesia for aggression against its neighbors. [5]

And as recently as June 1975 Congressman Silvio Conte recalled:

> I remember taking a tremendous amount of heat on the floor of the House when Sukarno told us to get out. They offered an amendment on the floor of the House to knock out all aid to Indonesia. I fought that. I do not know whether we won or lost, but it was as a result of continuing aid and continuing that small military program that Sukarno was thrown out and a democratic (sic) form of government was put in, without firing one shot (sic), without losing one American life.[6]

These officials might have taken too much credit (or blame?) for the removal of Sukarno, but their observations are more than 20-20 hindsight. The administration put forward the same argument during early sixties aid hearings and debates. Unfortunately, the details were deleted (for security readsons) from the record.

CIVIC ACTION

Soon after the fall of Sukarno, the US resumed economic assistance to Indonesia. The Indonesian military asked for weapons, but were turned down. The US determined that Indonesia's needs were economic, not military. Furthermore, "Indonesia had received from Eastern European sources sufficient equipment to meet its internal security needs."[7] Additional equipment, the US believed, might have encouraged forces within Indonesia to continue Sukarno's posture of confrontation with Malaysia.

To encourage the Indonesian military to emphasize internal security, the US arranged in 1967 to provide "military equipment, materials, and services...for a program of civic action."[8] Though civic action can mean military participation in constructive projects, it also means, like "pacification" in Vietnam, counterinsurgency.[9]

Indonesia needed -- and still needs -- projects for port, road, and public facility construction, land-clearing and irrigation engineering, which the civic action program assisted. The US provided bulldozers, road-graders, and other engineering equipment to improve Indonesia's infrastructure and to open virgin land on the outer islands for the resettlement of military veterans and their families.

To insure utilization of the quipment sent through the civic action program, the US established a number of training programs. In 1968 the US sent a team of 18 men to the military engineering school in Bogor. This team assisted "in training instructors, operators, and mechanics on new civic action equipment donated by the US"[10]. Other US personnel taught the English language and automotive rebuilding. In 1970 the US Embassy in Jakarta revealed that four civilianized Green Berets were training civic action teams in community development work.[11]

The military goals of the civic action program were obvious. Even after the coup, massacre of ½ million leftists, and arrests of tens of thousands more, millions of pro-Communist Indonesians remained at large. The military forces which led the coup wanted to improve their counter-insurgency capability. Though there were a few outbreaks of armed opposition to Suharto's government, the main impact of military action during the late 60's was to prevent insurrection.

Major aspects of the US civic action aid program directly contributed to Indonesia's capability to wage internal warfare. The US provided trucks and air transport aid (pilot training, spare parts, and eventually aircraft) to increase the mobility of the Indonesian armed forces. Vice-Admiral Ray Peet explained to Congress that road and bridge construction serve military as well as civilian needs.[12] Lt. Gen. George Seignious testified: "Major construction equipment...is certainly appropriate to internal security in Indonesia," because it increased military mobility.[13]

The Indonesian publication Dwiwarna questioned the development-oriented image of civic action:

> Why should the US technical advisers, if it is true that they are really employed in development projects in Indonesia, have been recruited from among the officers of the US armed forces?[14]

Civic action development programs not only discouraged insurgency; but also consolidated the political and economic power of the armed forces. In fact, the US established a program to train Indonesian

military officers in management techniques so they could manage state-owned enterprises and improve the efficiency of the armed forces themselves. The Agency for International Development contracted with Syracuse Univ.'s College of Business Administration to train Indonesian officers in a series of Civic Action Groups. The third group, which met at Syracuse from May to Dec. 1968 included officers who specialized in fields ranging from fruit-canning to farming, from industrial security systems to road repair, from community development to running the Dept. of Navy. In describing the objectives of the program, the Syracuse team noted, "The Armed Forces have played a significant role in the economic development of the country and are expected to play an even greater role in the future."[15]

COMBAT SUPPORT

By 1969 Indonesia had demonstrated its peaceful attitude toward its non-communist neighbors. Furthermore, its arsenal of weapons supplied before the coup had deteriorated because the Soviet Union and its allies had stopped supplying parts. The Pentagon adopted a new attitude toward military assistance to Indonesia Instead of turning down arms requests because Indonesia's needs were primarily economic, it decided to "supplement Indonesian efforts to create a military organization capable of maintaining internal security."[16]

In April, 1969 the U.S. signed an agreement with the Indonesian government promising to provide "basic pilot training aircraft." The U.S. promised to furnish "up to a squadron of T-41 aircraft, plus several replacement aircraft, and concurrent spare parts and equipment."[17] Lt.-General Robert Warren told Congress that the T-41's could be used for transportation, surveillance, and control, as well as training. He later explained:

> This decision was based on the essentiality of air transportation to a viable civic action program in the outer islands and the associated need for a continuing flow of trained pilots into the Indonesian Air Force.[18]

In 1970 the U.S. began specifically to provide combat equipment. Following a May, 1970 visit to the U.S. by President Suharto, the Nixon administration requested an authorization of $5.1 million for "Upgrading selected combat units (including weapons)."[19] In August, 1970 Indonesia and the U.S. exchanged notes, agreeing to carry out such assistance.[20] The U.S. supplied a reported $3 million worth of automatic M-16 rifles-- America's first-line infantry weapon -- light machine guns, pistols, carbines, mortars, and rocket launchers.[21] The U.S. also continued to supply communications, transportation, construction, and training equipment, much of which was labeled civic action but obviously could support combat operations as well.

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard defended the new aid before the House Foreign Affairs Committee as an "increase in support primarily in order to provide the Indonesians with the ability to contain (Communist) subversion."[22] State Department official Marshall Green -- ambassador to Indonesia at the time of the coup -- explained that the Indonesians were "acquiring a low-cost military capability responsive to their internal needs "[23]

The staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee questioned resumption of the American role as arms supplier. It pointed out,"the maintenance of security by the Suharto regime is not seriously in question."[24] Packard, however, contended that the Communist threat remained.[25] Whether or not the remnants of the Indonesian Communist Party and allied organizations posed a security risk, the aid helped the military

regime increase its authority.

The Foreign Affairs Committee staff and some committee members criticized the abandonment of America's low profile of activity in Indonesia. They suggested that American aid focus on training and that equipment be contributed through a consortium modeled after the IGGI development aid club.[26] But only a few other countries were willing to provide substantial military aid to Indonesia. Between 1972 and 1975 Australia provided $26 million in assistance including a squadron of old F-86 Sabre-jet fighters, boats, other equipment and training. New Zealand provided two T-6 light monoplanes through the Colombo Plan. The British shipped three "Short Skyvan" transports in 1970. And Malaysia resold some small aircraft that it had obtained second hand from Britain 10 years earlier.[27] European nations provided small amounts of aid, principally training, trucks, and spare parts.

The US continued to provide trucks, small arms, and communications equipment in the early 1970s. Such shipments increased dramatically when US troops pulled out of Indonehina, demobilizing vast amounts of equipment. In fiscal 1973 the US assigned only $469,000 (legal value) of excess equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. The next year it tranferred a whopping $7 million -- equipment worth $21 million new.[28]

In 1974 the Pentagon planned to ship 900 trucks to Indonesia. Admiral Peet told Congress:

> These trucks will contribute significantly to internal security and civic action through the balanced support of ongoing projects for rapid deployment of forces and equipment throughout the archipelago.[29]

Of the 1600 trucks scheduled for shipment to Indonesia in 1975, 1547 were to have come from excess stocks.[30]

Communications and other electronic equipment play a significant role in all forms of modern warfare. For Indonesia's military, which must command 14,000 islands spread more than 3,000 miles, such communications are absolutely necessary. Pentagon officials have repeatedly discussed the provision of such equipment to Indonesia's armed forces, but public records do not contain specifics. It is likely, though, that the military will be one of the prime users of Indonesia's massive satellite communications system, now under construction.

Since Indonesia is the world's largest island nation, coastal surveillance is one of its most difficult security operations. The Indonesian Navy patrols for smugglers as well as potential insurgents. There are at least 24 ships of US origin in the Indonesian Navy.[31] At least 10, including minesweepers, tank landing ships, and destroyer escorts, have been delivered since 1970. For those US-built ships already in the Indonesian fleet, the US supplies spare parts.

The ships have been transferred at virtually no cost to the Indonesian Navy. They have been made available through the Ship Loan Program and a leasing program. And at least two, claims Congressman Les Aspin, were sold at amazingly low prices. He charged that the US sold two destroyer escorts to Indonesia at a net price of $4400 per ship, "at best a 20th of their scrap value."[33]

AIRCRAFT

Under Sukarno, the Indonesian Air Force was the largest in Southeast Asia. Its Soviet-suppled planes included strategic jet bombers as well as modern jet fighters. When the military seized power, the Russians cut off the supply of spare parts; now the Russian-built

fleet is grounded.

When the US supplied the Indonesians with T-41 aircraft in 1969, it also furnished spare parts for American-built aircraft such as the Lockheed C-130 "Hercules" transport which had been grounded during the mid-60s ban on US military shipments.[34]

As the US increased its shipments of 2nd-hand aircraft to Indonesia, it maintained its goal of assisting counterinsurgency, not conventional warfare. The aircraft, be they fighters, transports, trainers, or helicopters, were cheap, small, and old. The US delivered between 6 and 14 F-51 "Mustang" fighters, 10 C-47 transports, 16 T-33 trainers, and 10 Sikorsky S-55 helicopters in 1972-73.[35]

By 1975, increased oil revenues had dramatically improved the Indonesian government's financial standing. It finally issued orders for new airplanes. It arranged to purchase and build (under license) European training and transport aircraft, and it added three more C-130 transports costing $8 million.

With the aid of an official US Foreign Military Sales Credit, the Indonesian Air Force ordered 16 OV-10 "Bronco" counterinsurgency aircraft from Rockwell International. Though a version of this plane was originally delivered to the US Air Force in 1967, the OV-10F reportedly designed for Indonesia contains more up-to-date electronic "avionic" equipment. The Indonesian government reports that the total cost of the OV-10 squadron is $23 million.[37]

The Indonesians did not purchase the Broncos because they are infatuated with sophisticated weaponry. It is a relatively inexpensive plane, whose design fits their needs. The OV-10, which saw action in Forward Air Control in Indochina, was specifically built for counterinsurgency operations. It can use Indonesia's short, rought runways, support anti-guerilla action, and provide aerial surveillance of foreign fishing trawlers.

Two trade publications have also reported the Indonesian purchase of a squadron of A-7 "Corsair" attack aircraft from the US,[38] but there has been no official announcement. Should the reports be true, it would indicate a significant broadening of Indonesia's military perspective. The Corsair is still the mainstay of the US Navy's carrier-based attack force; it was one of the workhorses of the air war on North Vietnam. It can be operated from land, but in any case it requires highly trained personnel to operate and maintain it.

## TRAINING

In addition to the civil and military management courses offered as part of military aid, the US (as well as Australia) provides specialized training along with the transfer of equipment. "Between 1971 and 1975, a total of 1500 Indonesian officers and technicians received some military training in the US..."[39] Others have received training within Indonesia. In 1971 , the US provided training to 210 Indonesian seamen so they could operate minesweepers provided to Indonesia the following year. 94 were trained for tank landing ships.[40] In 1974 the Dept. of Defense provided at least 9 Indonesians with advanced training in communications and electronics.[41]

To administer the various military aid programs and to advise the Indonesian military, the US has maintained a Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia since 1968. In March, 1975, this group had 56 US military personnel and 5 American civilians.[42] With military aid and sales increasing, both the Defense Liaison Group and US military training programs would increase.

## OILING THE WAY

Indonesia has produced petroleum since 1893. But not until recent years, with the rise of OPEC, did oil exports begin to improve

Indonesia's bleak international finances. Though Indonesia still has large debts, and its people are poor, oil income has increased the funds available to the Indonesian military.

American Congressmen, such as Otto Passman the powerful head of the House Subcommitee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, have demanded that Indonesia pay for its arms with its new wealth. Though the executive branch has warned that Indonesia isn't that rich, after all, Passman has won reductions in outright grant aid.

In fact, Indonesia is spending more for aircraft and other weapons. Indonesian orders of US military equipment totaled only $148,000 in fiscal 1974, but jumped to $48,514,000 in fiscal 1975. Of that figure, between $2.9 and $5.2 million were subsidized with Foreign Military Sales credits.[43] Other purchases may have been subsidized by other agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank.

REGIONAL POWER

Following the removal of US troops from Indochina, it is natural for US strategists to look to Indonesia, with its 140 million people, to counterbalance communist military power. Furthermore, the archipelago sits astride all major trade routes between the oil-rich Middle East and the nations of the Pacific. The US wants to expand the minor role Indonesia has played beyond its borders. (Indonesia has trained right-wing Cambodian troops, participated in Vietnam's shortlived International Commission of Control and Supervision, and even sent troops to the UN force in the Middle East.)

In 1971, the Pentagon's Packard told Congress:

> The gradual withdrawal of US ground forces from mainland Southeast Asia under the Nixon Doctrine is viewed by Indonesia's leaders as underlining the need to upgrade the area's indigenous defense capabilities. In this regard, the Suharto administration is now looking toward a greater and more responsible role in the security of Southeast Asia which is more in keeping with the country's size and population.[44]

In 1974, a Pentagon official explained: "One of the basic rationales for our assistance is to permit the Indonesians to play a constructive and stabilizing role in Southeast Asia and elsewhere."[45]

But Indonesia does not have the resources or technological sophistication to become a sub-imperial policeman in the near future. It does not even operate any F-5 "Freedom Fighter" aircraft, designed for poor countries that want jet aircraft for conventional warfare but cannot pay the price or train the personnel necessary for America's first line aircraft. (Neighboring Malyasia, however, just purchased fourteen.)

The Indonesians, though strongly anti-communist, do not posture themselves against the Vietnamese or the Chinese. They profess neutrality. Even when seeking additional military aid from the US, they declare that internal warfare is the greatest military threat that they face.[46]

There is one area, however, where Indonesia could try to exercise conventional military power. With Malaysia, it considers the Straits of Malacca to be national territory. At some point the two nations might try to exercise joint control But this is not a reason for the US to aid Indonesia. The US joins all other major maritime powers in declaring the straits to be an international waterway. If Indonesia ever asserts its claim, it could lose its aid.

It appears, therefore, that the US will not arm Indonesia to patrol Southeast Asia. In fact, the Indonesian magazine, Tempo

recently complained, "there is the explicit condition the Australian and American military aid may be used only to maintain domestic order and may not be used against foreign countries."[47]

As Tempo notes, "the US still fabors Australia in its military cooperation."[48] The US will continue to rely, for some time, on the rich more technologically capable Anglo-Saxons of Australia to take up sub-imperial duties in the region.

NEW AID DEBATE

Playing upon American fears of a domino-type collapse of pro-American governments in Southeast Asia, the Indonesians are pushing for more aid. Suharto requested more aid in July when he visited the US and a team led by Presidential Assistant Ali Murtopo followed up with a lobbying tour in October.[49]

Reports from Washington indicate that the State Department has decided to ask for $30 million in grant military aid for Indonesia in fiscal 1976 and $12.5 million in military sales credits.[50] Though the Pentagon had previously assured Congress that it planned to phase out grant aid,[51] the administration has apparently determined that Indonesia's finances have deteriorated to the point that grants should be increased.

Indonesia will continue to receive American military aid, but liberals and conservatives in Congress may join to make deep cuts in administration requests. Liberals oppose aid to dictatorships and countries which hold large numbers of political prisoners - such as Indonesia; conservatives oppose most aid as giveaways and aid to OPEC nations as particularly counterproductive.

The politics of aid to Indonesia may have come full circle in the past dozen years. Congress cut off aid to Indonesia in 1963, only to support the rearmament of a new, pro-American regime. Now, once again, Congress is concerned about spending the taxpayer's money in Indonesia. Liberal Democrat, Les Aspin, tried to tie together liberal and conservative sentiment against aiding Indonesia in his January, 1975 statement:

> As a member of the oil cartel, Indonesia is partly responsible for our economic problems. Why should we be helping them out with cut-rate military hardware?...The US has no treaty relationship with Indonesia. How can we be sure that the military equipment we give that country will help our national defense?[52]

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## POST-COUP U.S. MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA (in thousands)

| Fiscal Year | Grants [a] | Sales Orders | Excess Deliveries [b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1966 | -- | 1 | -- |
| 1967 | 2,500 | 1 | c |
| 1968 | 4,600 | 24 | 33 |
| 1969 | 4,900 | -- | 67 |
| 1970 | 5,400 | c | 444 |
| 1971 | 16.100 | 18 | 782 |
| 1972 | 18,000 | c | 642 |
| 1973 | 18,600 | 148 | 469[e] |
| 1974 | 14,000 | 148 | 7,000 |
| 1975 | 14,000-17,000 | 48,514 | 6,200 plus [f] |
| 1976 | 30,000 [d] | ? | ? |

a) Does not include ship loans, sales credits, and other miscellaneous programs
b) Legal value, 1/3 original acquisition cost
c) less than $500
d) Proposed by State Department
e) estimated
f) proposed

Sources: US Overseas Loans and Grants (July 1,1945-June 30,1974), (USAID, 1975) p.71.
Palo Alto Times (AP), October 21, 1975
Congressional Record, September 18, 1975, p.E4796 and June 6,1974, p.S9853
Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts. Defense Security Assistance Agency. April, 1972, May, 1973, April,1974

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## FOOTNOTES

1. Palo Alto Times (AP, October 21, 1975. These were State Department Proposals; the White House could reduce the final request.
2. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, (for 1966) House Appropriations Committee, part 1. p.1161.
3. "Military Assistance Training in East and Southeast Asia," Staff Report, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 16, 1971. p. 18. Congressional Record, Aug. 13, 1964. p. 19424.
4. Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee, p.706.
5. Military Assistance Training", p.18.
6. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 2, p. 631.
7. Foreign Assistance Legislation, FY 1972, hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 376.
8. "Indonesia: Military Assistance for a Civic Action Program," exchange of notes, April 14, 1967, State Department, TAIS 6247.
9. The Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines military civic action:

> The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, organization, communication, health, sanitation, and others contriubting to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

The US military's Joint Manual for Civil Affairs (Nov. 1966, p.29, quoted by State Dept. Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 1973-74, p.2) explains, "...military civic action projects are fully as important in promoting security and stability as are conventional tactics, weapons, and roles." While civic action projects can combat insurrection by treating its causes, their main impact is to increase the activity and mobility of the armed forces threatened by the insurgents.

10. "Military Assistance Training," p. 19.
11. New York, Times (Reuters), Feb. 20, 1970, p.14.
12. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1974, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 1, page 1149.
13. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1973, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 1, p. 783.
14. Dwiwarna, Feb. 21, 1971.,"Foreign Military Missions Keep Coming to Indonesia," in US Embassy Translation Unite Press Review.
15. "Indonesian Civic Action Group III," Syracuse Univ. International Management Development Department.
16. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird before House Foreign Affairs Committee, Nov. 25, 1970, cited in"Military Assistance Trainigg, p.20.
17. "Indonesia--Defense: Basic Pilot Training Aircraft," exchange of notes, April 9, 1969, State Department, TAIS 6678.
18. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 1, p. 809; Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, hearings House Appropriations Committee, part 1, p. 472.
19. "Military Assistance Training," p. 18.
20. "Indonesia: Military Assistance," exchange of notes, Aug. 18, 1970 State Department, TAIS 6959.
22. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee, p. 84.

23. Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee, p.246.
24. "Military Assistance Training," p. 20.
25. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, April, 1971, p.84.
26. "Military Assistance Training," pp.21-22; Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, pp. 10; IGGI stands for the "Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia."
27. World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1972, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, p. 137.
28. "Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts," Defense Security Assistance Agency, April, 1974. Legal value is one third of original acquisition cost.
29. Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1974, House hearings, part 1, p. 1150, The hearing records indicate planned shipments for both 1974 and 1975. They provide no information to confirm the number actually shipped.
30. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1975, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 1, p. 1163, See footnote 29.
31. Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1974, House hearings, part 1, p. 1149.
32. Foreign Assistance Appropriations, 1975, hearings, Senate Appropriations Committee, p. 1153; "Aspin Charges Ship Giveaway to Oil-Rich Indonesia," press release, Office of Congressman Les Aspin, Jan.22,1975.
33. "Aspin Charges Ship Giveaway." Net price meant $295,800 combined purchase price less $287,000 spent on training, repairs, equipment, and ammunition.
34. The Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations has revealed that Lockheed had attempted to circumvent the ban on spare parts shipments in 1965 (see Aviation Week, Sept. 22,1975, p.12). Resumption of aircraft parts shipments may have occurred in fiscal 1968 as civic action support (see Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 316).
35. Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1974, House hearings, part 1, p. 1302; Arms Trade Register, (SIPRI, 1975); International Air Forces Directory, Aviation Advisory Services, Stapleford, England, 1975.
36. Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Yaar 1976, hearings, Senate Approprations Committee, part 5, p. 249.
37. MILAVNEWS, Aviation Advisory Services, March, 1975, p. 15; Indonesia News and Views, Indonesian Embassy in Washington, September, 1975.
38. Air Combat, July, 1975; MILAVNEWS, Nov. 1974 and Dec. 1974.
39. Michael T. Klare, "Indonesia and the Nixon Doctrine," manuscript, 1975, citing US Department of Defense data sheets, 1975.
40. Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1973, House hearings, part 1, p.785; Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1972, hearings, House Appropriations Committee, part 1, p. 135.
41. Fiscal Year 1976 and July-Sept. 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee, part 5, p. 2383.
42. ibid, p. 2484.
43. Congressional Record: Sept. 18, 1975, p. E4796; June 24, 1975, p. S11406; and August 6, 1975, p.H7756. $2.9 million in credits had been used by June 11, 1975 toward total sales of $37.2 million by that date (FY ended June 30). The administration had originally sought $6.2 million in credits.
44. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, p. 78.
45. Foreign Assistance Appropriations, House hearings, part 1, p. 1178.
46. See Ali Murtopo, "Future Developments in SE Asia and the Role of the US," speech reprinted in the Congressional Record, Oct. 20, 1975, H10096-7.
47. Tempo, Oct. 25, 1975, in US Embassy Translation Unit Press Review (Jakarta).
48. ibid.
49. ibid; Washington Post, July 24, 1975, p. A35.
50. Palo Alto Times (AP), October 21, 1975.
51. Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1975, House hearings, part 1, p. 1175.
52. "Aspin Charges Ship Giveaway."